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Trust has long been recognized, by scholars and practitioners alike, as an important
factor for negotiation success. However, there has been little effort to date to empiri-
cally review or theoretically synthesize the research on trust in the context of negoti-
ations. We present a social exchange framework that describes the processes through
which trust influences negotiation behaviors and outcomes. We identified three critical
contingencies that modified the effects of trust on negotiation behaviors and outcomes.
A meta-analysis on a sample of 38 independent studies provided considerable support
for the model, and also confirmed the importance of the three contingencies for
understanding the effects of trust. The framework and accompanying empirical evi-
dence provide a necessary theoretical and empirical integration of the trust and
negotiation literatures. Based on the theory and meta-analytical findings, we identified
critical gaps and limitations in existing research, and we propose a research agenda to
address key theoretical, empirical, and methodological issues identified by our frame-
work and review.
Negotiators face a dilemma: On one hand, they
recognize that, by working cooperatively with their
counterpart, they may be able to increase their own
welfare and perhaps also the welfare of their part-
ner (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). For example, by shar-
ing information about their preferences and en-
couraging their counterparts to share information
in return, negotiators may be able to craft a mutu-
ally agreeable solution that makes both of them
better off (Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, & Pil-
lutla, 1999; Thompson, 1991). On the other hand,
negotiators recognize that these cooperative behav-
iors put them at risk of being taken advantage of by
their counterparts. For example, one’s counterpart
may be tempted not to share information in return,
but instead exploit the information for personal
gain at one’s expense. This dilemma, which is com-
mon to many social situations but is particularly
acute in negotiations (Kelley, 1966), naturally in-
vokes the concept of trust.
In the dilemma described above, negotiators may
become better or worse off in the negotiation. In
other words, negotiations involve not only oppor-
tunities but also risks. Additionally, whether one
negotiator ends up better or worse off is contingent
upon the behavior of the other negotiator. Thus,
negotiations also involve interdependence. Rous-
seau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998: 395) observed
that trust—defined as “the intention to accept vulner-
ability based upon positive expectations of the inten-
tions or behavior of another”—involves both risk
and interdependence. Thus, trust is a concept that
is a natural and integral element of negotiations.
What is the current state of thought and knowl-
edge about the role of trust in the context of nego-
tiations? Bazerman and Neale (1992: 90–91) listed
trust building as “Strategy 1” for creating mutually
beneficial agreements, and Thompson, Wang, and
Gunia (2010: 501) asserted that “[m]utual trust is an
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essential ingredient of effective negotiations.” Rep-
resenting an alternative view, Nobel Prize Laureate
Williamson (1993: 469) declared, “I maintain that
trust is irrelevant to commercial exchange and that
reference to trust in this connection promotes con-
fusion.” Finally, the dynamics described in the
opening paragraph might even suggest that trusting
one’s counterpart is detrimental, as it sets one up to
be exploited. The empirical literature does little to
resolve these contrasting views. Some studies have
found that negotiators’ trust promotes collaboration
(De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, & Euwema, 2006) and
better negotiated outcomes (Schurr & Ozanne,
1985). Other studies, however, have found that
trust is not related to the degree of collaboration (De
Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliet, 1998; Gunia, Brett,
Nandkeolyar, & Kamdar, 2011) or joint outcomes
achieved (Butler, 1999; Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau,
Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980). And, surpris-
ingly, we did not find a single study that specifi-
cally set out to examine the question of whether
trust predicts an individual’s own outcome in a
negotiation. In summary, the current literature
yields divergent opinions as well as conflicting and
limited evidence regarding the role of trust in
negotiations.
There is much to gain from better understanding
the role of trust in negotiations. Negotiation has
achieved considerable popularity in business
school education and leadership training, presum-
ably because individuals have a strong desire to
improve their negotiation outcomes. What should
negotiation training advocate for the role of trust in
negotiations? When will it yield better outcomes?
The potential gain is equally important for re-
search. The negotiation and trust literatures have
grown extensively in recent decades, and negotia-
tion and trust have been among the most studied
topics in organizational behavior. However, there
has been limited integration between these litera-
tures. For example, although negotiation studies do
sometimes examine trust, the concept tends to be
included in an ancillary, as opposed to focal, role.
As a consequence, research on trust in negotiations
has focused on rather elementary issues and rela-
tionships and has not sufficiently considered some
more complex—and also fundamental—roles that
trust may play in negotiations. Meanwhile, the lit-
erature on trust has largely focused on contexts
such as trust toward leaders (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002),
among peers (McAllister, 1995), in teams (De Jong
& Elfring, 2010), and between organizations (Za-
heer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998), and much less on
trust in the negotiation context. Not only do nego-
tiations provide a promising arena for future trust
research, but research in this arena may also yield
new insights for existing areas.
The present study provides insights into three
fundamental questions. First, what is the overall
relationship between trust and negotiation behav-
iors/outcomes? Does it “pay” to trust? Second,
through what processes does trust influence nego-
tiation behaviors/outcomes? Third, what critical
contingencies determine when these relationships
are stronger or weaker? To address these questions,
we seek to meta-analyze the existing empirical ev-
idence on trust in the context of interpersonal (dy-
adic) negotiations. Our study advances knowledge
by identifying what is known about the existence,
strength, and variability of core relationships; iden-
tifying moderators not yet studied systematically;
developing a theoretical framework to guide future
research; and identifying important issues or ques-
tions that need to be resolved.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
A negotiation is a social process in which multi-
ple, interdependent parties with non-identical
preferences mutually decide how to allocate scare
resources (Neale & Northcraft, 1991; Pruitt, 1983).
This study will focus on negotiations between two
individuals. Negotiation is a ubiquitous social ac-
tivity that occurs when individuals do not have
identical interests but nevertheless must rely upon
others to reach their goals (Carnevale & Pruitt,
1992; Thompson et al., 2010). In negotiations, par-
ties can have opposing interests (competitive),
aligned interests (cooperative), or, most commonly,
a mixture of interests (mixed motives) (Deutsch,
1949). Trust has been recognized as relevant in
mixed motive situations as there is uncertainty
about a counterpart’s motives and potential behav-
iors (Ferrin & Dirks, 2003).
Having defined forms of interdependence in his
earlier work, Deutsch (1958) also provided one of
the early treatments of trust, discussing its impor-
tance in a variety of social situations in which an
individual’s gains and losses are dependent on a
counterpart’s behaviors. Trust research has since
expanded into an extensive literature (Dirks & Fer-
rin, 2001; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012; Kramer, 1999;
Searle, Weibel, & Den Hartog, 2011). Researchers
have identified a general model in which trust leads
to individuals’ willingness to take risks and then re-
alize the consequences through various attitudes and
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performance-related outcomes (Mayer, Davis, &
Schoorman, 1995). This model has been validated
using data from a range of organizational settings
and work relationships (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine,
2007; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002).
Despite their common roots, our review revealed
that the negotiation literature has been slow to in-
tegrate the last two decades’ developments in trust
theory and measures. This lack of integration may
be due, at least in part, to the lack of a common
framework for understanding trust in the negotia-
tion context. Therefore, we begin by developing a
theoretical framework, based on social exchange
theory, to describe the role of trust in interpersonal
negotiations.
Negotiations and Trust as Social Exchange
Social exchange theory, which has its roots in
sociology, social psychology, and anthropology,
has been used as a theoretical lens in numerous
areas of study within organizational behavior and
management (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Social
exchange theory is based on the notion that many
human interactions, and many commercial ex-
changes, involve the simultaneous transacting of
economic and social goods, resulting in both con-
tractual and relational bonds. Social exchange dif-
fers from economic exchange in a number of ways.
First, according to Blau (1964: 94), “social ex-
change tends to engender feelings of personal obli-
gation, gratitude, and trust; purely economic ex-
change as such does not.” Trust and obligations
become relevant because social exchange involves
uncertainty and risk in how exchange occurs. Sec-
ond, the “goods” exchanged include not only extrin-
sic goods but also intrinsic benefits such as approval,
assistance, socioemotional support, and so on (Foa &
Foa, 1974). Third, typically, these benefits are not
exchanged in a specified, contractual manner, but
voluntarily and informally, usually according to the
norm of reciprocity.
Negotiation researchers will recognize that the
above elements of social exchange theory very
much reflect the negotiation experience. While ne-
gotiations involve the exchange of material goods,
they also typically involve the exchange of intrinsic
benefits such as compliments and informal assis-
tance. While some negotiations conclude with a
formal agreement, many do not, and even the most
formal agreement cannot capture all the intrinsic
benefits involved. In most negotiations, issues typ-
ically have different importance to negotiators; ne-
gotiators can utilize their different preferences to
arrive at a mutually beneficial outcome (Lax &
Sebenius, 2003). Despite these similarities, social
exchange theory has not been extensively adopted
in negotiation research. Cropanzano and Mitchell
(2005: 878) concluded that negotiations had “gen-
erally not been considered in light of social ex-
change theory.” Our review revealed that social
exchange theory is implicit in many studies and
has occasionally been made explicit. For example,
some researchers have recognized the applicability
of social exchange theory by studying the relative
predictive validity of social exchange versus
agency theory in the context of negotiations (Bot-
tom, Holloway, Miller, Mislin, & Whitford, 2006),
comparing the effects of “reciprocal exchange” (in-
formal, non-binding exchange) to “negotiated ex-
change” (use and enforcement of binding agree-
ments) (Molm, Takahashi, & Peterson, 2000), or
drawing on common intellectual roots (Kim,
Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005).
Trust researchers also recognize the elements of
social exchange theory as capturing the processes
through which trust develops and functions in
work relationships. Authors are increasingly recog-
nizing its ability to describe how trust develops and
functions in work relationships (Colquitt, LePine,
Piccolo, Zapata, & Rich, 2012; Dirks & Skarlicki,
2009; Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; Whitener, Brodt,
Korsgaard, & Werner, 1998). Based on the above,
social exchange theory seems particularly promis-
ing as a framework to integrate trust and negotia-
tions, and to develop predictions about the role of
trust in negotiations.
Starting Assumptions
In our literature review, we noted that, in the
body of empirical work, studies vary in the negoti-
ation structure studied, the conceptualization of
trust, and the level of analysis, and these variations
reflect important theoretical and research design
issues. Accordingly, in our theorizing, we begin
with three simplifying assumptions, each of which
we will later relax and examine empirically. First,
negotiations can be highly competitive, highly co-
operative, or mixed motive in nature (Deutsch,
1949). Indeed, in our review, we noted that some
negotiations had an entirely competitive structure,
in which negotiators’ interests were competitive
rather than cooperative (e.g., Srivastava & Chakra-
varti, 2009), some had a highly cooperative struc-
ture (e.g., Conlon & Hunt, 2002), and many other
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studies ranged between these extremes. For our
main effect hypothesis development, we assume
that the structure of negotiations includes both co-
operative and competitive motivations (we will re-
fer to these as having a moderate level of “integra-
tive potential”). Later, we consider the implications
of variation on this factor.
Second, in reviewing the literature on trust, Fer-
rin, Bligh, and Kohles (2008: 174) observed that
trust has been treated as “a family of constructs,”
both in theory and measurement;1 Ross and La-
Croix (1996) made a similar observation of trust in
their study of negotiations. Indeed, in our review,
we noted that studies varied in the operational
definitions of trust. For instance, some studies de-
fined trust as a broad concept (e.g., De Dreu et al.,
1998; Gunia et al., 2011), whereas others defined it
as a specific dimension of trustworthiness (e.g.,
Schurr & Ozanne, 1985; Srivastava & Chakravarti,
2009). Thus, we begin by treating the construct of
trust as broad and encompassing a range of more
specific conceptualizations and measures. Later,
we test whether results differ according to the form
of trust studied.
Third, within the negotiation literature, trust is
often treated as a concept at the individual level
(e.g., Gunia et al., 2011), but sometimes at the dy-
adic level (e.g., De Dreu et al., 1998). Thus, in
developing our hypotheses of the effects of trust,
we will make the simplifying assumption that trust
has similar effects regardless of its level. Later in
the paper, we will test the level of analysis as a
critical contingency that may influence the magni-
tudes of the effects.
EFFECTS OF TRUST IN INTERPERSONAL
NEGOTIATIONS
Social exchange theory recognizes that relation-
ships involve processes in which prior conditions,
particularly trust, affect future behaviors and out-
comes (Blau, 1964). We focus on the relationships
trust has with its three classes of consequences in the
negotiation context: (1) negotiation behaviors, (2) ex-
trinsic outcomes (joint and individual), and (3) out-
come satisfaction. Consistent with social exchange
theory, our framework recognizes that trust shapes
negotiation behaviors, which in turn influence extrin-
sic outcomes and outcome satisfaction.
Negotiation Behaviors
Negotiation behaviors can be classified into two
main categories: integrative and distributive behav-
iors (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Walton & McKersie,
1965). Integrative behaviors are cooperative behav-
iors aimed at creating value (“enlarging the pie”),
such as exchanging information about preferences
and interests, proposing and exploring options for
mutual gains, packaging issues in value-creating
ways, and relationship building. Distributive be-
haviors are those aimed at claiming value (“slicing
the pie”), including extreme offers and counterof-
fers, selective, strategic, or resistant sharing of in-
formation, gamesmanship and non-reciprocity in
concessions, and exploitation of power advantages
(Weingart, Olekalns, & Smith, 2004; Weingart,
Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990). In mixed
motive negotiations, negotiators need to create and
claim value (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Therefore, they
may exhibit a combination of integrative and dis-
tributive behaviors.
Several researchers have proposed that trust will
increase integrative behaviors and decrease distrib-
utive behaviors (Butler, 1999; Gunia et al., 2011;
Kimmel et al., 1980). One key distinction between
integrative and distributive behaviors is the extent
to which they make the negotiator vulnerable and
involve a willingness to accept risk versus protect
one’s own interests. Integrative behaviors are inher-
ently risky. The information that one shares, the
exploration of routes for joint gains, and efforts to
build a relationship can all be exploited by the
counterpart. If one trusts the counterpart, social
exchange theory would predict that he or she will
be willing to engage in these behaviors because of
an expectation that the behaviors will be recipro-
cated and, ultimately, yield benefits. Distributive
behaviors, on the other hand, are self-protective
and limit vulnerability. One makes extreme offers,
carefully restricts information sharing, resists re-
ciprocating concessions, and perhaps even falsifies
information in order to get the better part of a deal
at the expense of one’s partner, or to ensure the
other party does not get a better deal at one’s own
expense. For instance, Mayer and Gavin (2005) and
Dirks (1999) noted that individuals who lack trust
in leaders or teammates tend to focus their energy
on protecting themselves. Consequently, a negotia-
1 Ferrin et al. (2008: 174) observed that “the ‘trust’
label was used to refer to operational definitions of trust
as: (1) a perception of another’s perceived ability, (2) a
perception of another’s perceived integrity, (3) positive
confident expectations, (4) a willingness to accept vul-
nerability, and (5) trusting actions.”
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tor who has little trust in the counterpart is less
willing to accept vulnerability toward the counter-
part and will therefore opt for more distributive
and fewer integrative behaviors than a negotiator
who trusts the counterpart.
Hypothesis 1a. Trust is negatively related to
distributive behaviors.
Hypothesis 1b. Trust is positively related to
integrative behaviors.
Extrinsic Outcomes
Underlying social exchange theory is the notion
that two parties engage in social exchange because
they may achieve extrinsic benefits through the
exchange that could not be achieved otherwise.
These benefits can be joint and for oneself.
Joint outcome. As argued above, trust is pre-
dicted to increase integrative behaviors. Parties
who engage more in integrative behaviors, such as
sharing information about their interests and pref-
erences and solving problems collaboratively, are
likely to discover and agree to solutions that are
more creative and effective at meeting their joint
interests. Such solutions reflect value creation
above and beyond a simple distributive, value-
claiming solution (Raiffa, 1982). On the other hand,
parties who have little trust in each other are likely
to engage in fewer integrative behaviors, and thus
arrive at a lower joint outcome.
As predicted above, parties who have little trust
in each other are more likely to engage in distribu-
tive behaviors such as withholding or distorting
information, refusing to reciprocate, and resisting
the exploration of creative solutions. These value-
claiming behaviors may be successful for advanc-
ing or protecting a single party’s interests (as will
be discussed below), but such behaviors are likely
to drive negotiators to value-claiming solutions
with lower joint gains. Conversely, parties who
trust each other are likely to avoid such distributive
behaviors, and thus arrive at solutions that are
likely to involve more value creation and less value
claiming. In sum, distribute behaviors short-circuit
the exchange processes that yield mutual benefits,
whereas integrative behaviors contribute to them.
Hypothesis 2a. Trust is positively related to
joint outcomes.
Hypothesis 2b. The relationship between trust
and joint outcomes is fully mediated by inte-
grative behaviors and distributive behaviors.
Trustor’s outcome. Of course, negotiators are
concerned with their own outcomes to an equal or
greater degree than joint outcomes. Negotiation
scholars, teachers, and practitioners often assume
that trust provides a valuable route toward better
“take-home” negotiated outcomes. We found no
published study, however, that was purposefully
designed to test the effect of trust on individual
negotiation outcomes.
As noted above, we expect that trust will increase
integrative behaviors and decrease distributive be-
haviors. The reduction in distributive behaviors in
response to higher trust is likely to decrease the
trustor’s own outcome by reducing value claiming
and self-protective behaviors. Meanwhile, the pos-
itive effect of trust on integrative behaviors may
have mixed effects on the trustor’s outcome. On
one hand, integrative behaviors may increase the
joint outcome (as argued above), which will ulti-
mately be split between the two parties. Thus, one’s
own outcome has potential to increase. On the
other hand, one’s integrative behaviors that flow
from trusting the counterpart (e.g., sharing informa-
tion) put one at risk of being exploited by the coun-
terpart who seeks to maximize her or his own out-
come, which could then lower one’s individual
outcome. Thus, the overall effect of trust on the
trustor’s outcome is variable and small on average,
given the contradictory effects from integrative be-
haviors and distributive behaviors.
Hypothesis 3a. Trust is positively related to the
trustor’s outcome.
Hypothesis 3b. The relationship between trust
and the trustor’s outcome is fully mediated by
integrative behaviors and distributive behaviors.
Hypothesis 3c. The relationship between trust
and the trustor’s outcome is weaker than the
relationship between trust and the joint
outcome.
Outcome Satisfaction
Negotiations involve the exchange of both tangi-
ble economic outcomes and social–psychological
outcomes (Thompson, 1990a). Curhan, Elfenbein,
and Xu (2006) found that the latter fall into four
categories: feelings about the negotiation outcome,
the self, the negotiation process, and the relation-
ship. We focus on satisfaction with the negotiation
outcome. Outcome satisfaction is derived from ne-
gotiators’ interpretation of their extrinsic outcomes.
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For example, outcome satisfaction can be driven by
a comparison between negotiators’ extrinsic out-
comes and their prior expectations (Oliver,
Balakrishnan, & Barry, 1994), or a social compari-
son regarding how they believe they performed as
compared to their counterpart (Loewenstein,
Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989).
Social exchange theory suggests two ways that
trust affects outcome satisfaction. First, we expect a
direct effect: the level of trust in the counterpart
will provide a lens through which various aspects
of the exchange are perceived and valued, includ-
ing outcome satisfaction. In other words, trust will
cast a positive halo on other factors. Second, trust
may affect outcome satisfaction via negotiation be-
haviors. Specifically, trust increases integrative be-
haviors, which create a sense of fairness in process
and reinforce the relationship; these factors are de-
sired intrinsic outcomes in social exchange. Simi-
larly, trust influences distributive behaviors,
which, because of their contentious nature, de-
crease intrinsic outcomes, but simultaneously yield
personal extrinsic outcomes valued in social
exchange.
Hypothesis 4a. Trust is positively related to
outcome satisfaction.
Hypothesis 4b. The relationship between trust
and outcome satisfaction is partially mediated
by integrative and distributive behaviors.
CRITICAL CONTINGENCIES
We now relax the initial simplifying assumptions
to consider three factors that vary across studies,
are prevalent in research, and are expected to be
particularly consequential.
Integrative Potential
Earlier, we assumed that negotiations comprised
a relatively equal mixture of competitive and coop-
erative motives. As noted above, in reality, negoti-
ations vary in this mixture, with some being en-
tirely or mostly competitive, some being entirely or
mostly cooperative, and many ranging between
these two extremes (De Dreu et al., 1998). We hy-
pothesize that the impact of trust on negotiation
outcomes will differ according to the level of inte-
grative potential inherent in the structure of a
negotiation.
While scholars have recognized the relevance of
integrative potential (De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel,
2000; Murnighan et al., 1999), its definition has
proved elusive, posing a challenge for its operation-
alization. We define integrative potential as the
extent to which, based on the structure of the ne-
gotiation and, particularly, the interests and mo-
tives of the negotiators, negotiators are able to reach
multiple possible agreements with different levels
of joint outcomes. For a negotiation in which the
incentives are purely distributive, there is only one
possible joint outcome, which is, by necessity, dis-
tributive. In contrast, for a negotiation in which the
incentives are more integrative, multiple possible
joint outcomes of different values exist, and the
overall value of that outcome varies according to
how well the settlements on the combination of
issues meet the negotiators’ objectives (Tripp &
Sondak, 1992). In short, integrative potential in-
creases the possibility for gain by collaboration,
and, thus, the relevance of social exchange.
We argued that, because integrative behaviors are
risky and distributive behaviors are self-protective,
trust is positively related to integrative behaviors
and negatively related to distributive behaviors. We
now extend the argument to propose that, as the
integrative potential of a negotiation increases, the
effects of trust on integrative behaviors and joint
outcomes are likely to further increase. We expect
these effects for two reasons. First, negotiators sel-
dom know the full extent of the integrative poten-
tial of a negotiation because this requires knowl-
edge of both sides of the deal. However, prior to the
negotiation, individuals can gain a sense of the
integrative potential by considering the number of
issues, the range of possible solutions to those is-
sues, the potential trade-offs, and so forth. If the
integrative potential is perceived to be substantial,
high-trust negotiators will be more motivated to
make themselves vulnerable by engaging in integra-
tive behaviors because the negotiation provides an
opportunity to discover a mutually beneficial solu-
tion that outweighs the risk of exploitation. But, if
the integrative potential is perceived to be minimal
or nonexistent, high-trust negotiators are less likely
to engage in integrative behaviors, given the higher
risk of exploitation relative to the benefits of coop-
eration (see Mayer et al., 1995).
Second, the level of integrative potential typi-
cally becomes more evident during the course of a
negotiation, as parties exchange information and
explore potential options and trade-offs. We expect
that high-trust negotiators who engage in integra-
tive behaviors where there is high integrative po-
tential are likely to discover ways of creating value
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during the negotiation, thus encouraging them to
continue the pattern of behaviors. On the other
hand, high-trust negotiators who engage in integra-
tive behaviors where integrative potential is low
are likely to find few or no opportunities for value
creation, which should suppress the motivation to
continue with integrative behaviors in the rest of
the negotiation. Finally, as integrative potential
strengthens the relationship between trust and in-
tegrative behaviors, following Hypothesis 2b, it
should also strengthen the relationship between
trust and the joint outcome.
Hypothesis 5a. The effect of trust on integrative
behaviors is moderated by the degree of integra-
tive potential in the structure of the negotiation;
the effect of trust on integrative behaviors in-
creases as integrative potential increases.
Hypothesis 5b. The effect of trust on the joint
outcome is moderated by the degree of integra-
tive potential in the structure of the negotia-
tion; the effect of trust on the joint outcome
increases as integrative potential increases.
Level of Analysis of Trust
Trust in interpersonal negotiations inherently
comprises two levels of analysis: the individual
and the dyad. Negotiation studies typically exam-
ine individual trust, although occasionally they
consider the dyadic level. One major distinction
between these levels is the theoretical meaning and
empirical manifestation of trust. Trust researchers
typically conceptualize trust as an individual-level
concept (i.e., a psychological state existing in the
mind of one individual regarding another). In con-
trast, a dyad-level study of trust and negotiation
would assume, and often empirically verify, that
two parties have a common level of trust (i.e., in-
dividuals trust each other to a similar degree).
Blau (1964) argued that effective social exchange
relationships require not only high levels of ex-
change but also high reciprocity of exchange. To
achieve this, reciprocity in trust may be necessary
(De Jong & Dirks, 2012). Specifically, when a nego-
tiator trusts the counterpart and the trust is recip-
rocated, the negotiator is likely to expect the coun-
terpart to behave cooperatively and engage in
integrative behaviors. However, if a negotiator’s
trust is not reciprocated by the counterpart, the
negotiator is likely to expect the counterpart to
behave competitively and engage in distributive
behaviors. To the extent that this occurs or is even
suspected, integrative behaviors and mutually ben-
eficial outcomes will quickly be extinguished. One
of the ways to address this concern is to have trust
that is not only high but also mutual. Indeed, trust
congruence theory (Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki,
2009) suggests that, when negotiators have congru-
ent trust (i.e., negotiators trust each other at the
same level), such congruent trust generates syner-
gistic effects on the exchange of information and
benefits. The exchange of information and benefits
then leads to a positive joint outcome (Butler, 1999;
Roth & Murnighan, 1982; Weingart et al., 1990). As
a consequence, we predict that trust will be more
strongly and positively related to integrative behav-
iors and the joint outcome when trust is assessed at
the dyadic level, compared to when trust is as-
sessed at the individual level. Likewise, we expect
dyadic trust to be more strongly and negatively
related to distributive behaviors than individual
trust. In making these predictions, we assume (and
our review supports) that studies operationalizing
trust at the dyadic level usually provide empirical
justification for the dyad-level operationalization
(including congruence of trust).
Hypothesis 6a. Dyadic trust has stronger posi-
tive effects on integrative behaviors and the
joint outcome than individual trust.
Hypothesis 6b. Dyadic trust has a stronger neg-
ative effect on distributive behaviors than
individual trust.
Meaning and Measure of Trust
In their review of trust within negotiations, Ross
and LaCroix (1996: 315) queried, “what exactly is
meant by ‘trust?’” Similarly, Naquin and Paulson
(2003: 114) noted that, “[w]hereas its importance is
frequently noted, trust has historically proved to be
an elusive construct with multiple interpretations.”
The trust literature suggests that there are three
factors of trustworthiness: perceived integrity, abil-
ity, and benevolence (Mayer & Davis, 1999; Mayer
et al., 1995). Integrity refers to the perception that
the target will adhere to sound moral values, such
as being honest and fair, and can be depended upon
to act consistently with those values. Ability refers
to the perception that the target person is trustwor-
thy in terms of having a certain skill set or ability
relevant to performance. Benevolence refers to the
perception that the target cares about the well-be-
ing of the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit
motive.
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Integrity, ability, and benevolence represent dif-
ferent factors on which individuals might be de-
pendent upon another in a negotiation. Gunia et al.
(2011) found that American and Indian negotiators
included all three factors in their view of trust.
Existing research, however, has given little consid-
eration to whether it is meaningful to focus on a
broad measure of trust or to differentiate among the
three factors of trustworthiness. In existing re-
search (see Methods for details), a sizeable number
of studies has focused on the integrity factor (e.g.,
the counterpart is honest or fair). Meanwhile, other
studies have measured trust as a broad concept,
either by (a) utilizing a scale that taps multiple
elements of trust, (b) measuring trust with one or
more general trust questions (e.g., “How much did
you trust the other party during the negotiation?”;
Maddux, Mullen, & Galinsky, 2008: 466), or (c)
measuring trust with items capturing general inten-
tions to trust.2 This is not merely a measurement
issue, but also has substantive implications, as un-
derstanding whether some forms of trust are more
strongly related to outcomes than others may gov-
ern the substance of interventions that generate
desired outcomes.
A social exchange logic suggests that the type of
trust that is measured should focus on the nature of
uncertainty within social exchange (Dirks & Skar-
licki, 2009). When it comes to distributive behav-
iors, we would expect perceived integrity to be
most relevant. For example, in determining
whether to focus on value claiming, one would be
interested in determining whether the counterpart
will be honest and fair in dealings. A question of
ability, in contrast, is not relevant. Thus, a focus on
integrity is likely to demonstrate the strongest and
most consistent results. Adding other, nonrelevant
factors would weaken the effect.
In contrast, integrative behaviors may be affected
by a broader set of factors. When considering inte-
grative behaviors, a negotiator is interested not only
in whether the counterpart will be honest, fair, and
willing to reciprocate cooperation, but also in the
issues of ability and benevolence. The negotiator
will be concerned about whether the counterpart
has the ability to craft an integrative agreement. For
example, experienced or skilled negotiators report
that they would prefer to negotiate with skilled
negotiators for this reason (Benoliel & Cashdan,
2010). By the same token, negotiators tend to reach
integrative agreements by pursuing collective inter-
ests. Hence, negotiators will be concerned about
whether their counterparts are benevolent. Thus,
we expect a broader definition of trust, as opposed
to just perceived integrity, to be relevant to integra-
tive behaviors and the joint outcome.
Hypothesis 7a. Perceived integrity is more
strongly related to distributive behaviors than
a broad measure of trust.
Hypothesis 7b. A broad measure of trust is
more strongly related to integrative behaviors
and the joint outcome than perceived integrity.
In summary, trust is expected to set in motion
negotiation processes that, ultimately, facilitate the
joint outcome, trustor’s outcome, and outcome sat-
isfaction via integrative behaviors and distributive
behaviors. These effects are likely to be moderated
by integrative potential, the level of trust, and the
meaning and measure of trust.
METHODS
Sample
We performed a comprehensive search to iden-
tify substantially all empirical studies of trust in
the context of negotiation. We used the PsycINFO,
PsycARTICLES, Web of Science, Wiley Inter-
science, ScienceDirect, Dissertation & Theses (Pro-
Quest), Social Science Research Network, and
Academy of Management archives’ search engines
to identify studies for potential inclusion. We also
electronically searched journals expected to in-
clude studies of interest: Academy of Management
Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Ameri-
can Economic Review, American Journal of Sociol-
ogy, American Sociological Review, Industrial and
Labor Relations Review, International Journal of
Conflict Management, Journal of Applied Psychol-
ogy, Journal of International Business Studies, Jour-
nal of Experimental Social Psychology, Journal of
Management Studies, Journal of Organizational Be-
havior, Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, Management Science, Negotiation and Con-
flict Management Research, Organization Science,
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Pro-
2 Prior theoretical and empirical research suggests that
the latter two reflect integrity, benevolence, and ability in
combination. Thus, in our review, we will examine
whether research that focuses on integrity only yields
different results in theoretically meaningful ways than
broad measures of trust, which explicitly or implicitly
comprise a broader array of factors (Butler, 1991; Clark &
Payne, 1997; Colquitt et al., 2007).
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cesses, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
and Personnel Psychology. Finally, we searched the
citations to Mayer et al. (1995) and Colquitt et al.
(2007) through Web of Science. In the above, we
searched the terms negotiat*, bargaining, bar-
gainer, dispute, or disputant in the title, subject
term, and keyword fields to first identify negotia-
tion studies, then we limited the search to studies
with terms trust, trustworthiness, perceived ability,
perceived competence, benevolence, benevolent,
integrity, reliability, reliable, dependability, or de-
pendable in the titles, subject terms, and keywords
of the papers wherein trust was treated as a key
variable.
In addition to the electronic search above, we
also called for unpublished papers through the list-
serves of the Academy of Management, the Interna-
tional Association for Conflict Management, and
the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, and
we contacted prominent scholars in these areas to
directly identify any unpublished studies.
Papers were included in our meta-analysis if they
focused on interpersonal negotiations as defined in
this study (not a third-/multi-party negotiation, an
ultimatum game, a prisoner’s dilemma game, a
trust game, an allocation decision making study, or
an organization-level negotiation), and if they ex-
amined trust as an interpersonal variable (there-
fore, we excluded studies in which trust was only
examined as a dispositional variable, such as trust
propensity). Finally, when we found instances of
dissertation/thesis data also being reported in jour-
nals, we retained the results published in the jour-
nals rather than those in the dissertations/theses.
After applying the above inclusion criteria, 61 pa-
pers and dissertations/theses were included for
coding.
Variable Coding
Coding was done by the first author based on the
agreed-upon working definitions created by all
three authors. Most of the coding was unambigu-
ous, based on the definitions. When coding re-
quired a judgment call, the first two authors dis-
cussed and jointly decided on the coding strategy.
Integrative behaviors were conceptualized as nego-
tiation behaviors motivated by increasing joint out-
comes, whereas distributive behaviors were con-
ceptualized as negotiation behaviors motivated by
increasing individuals’ own outcomes. Therefore,
in coding distributive behaviors, we included both
ethical and unethical distributive behaviors, as
they both stem from competitive/uncooperative
motives and are correlated (Robinson, Lewicki, &
Donahue, 2000).
Meta-analysis only requires two bivariate ef-
fects for calculating statistics, but a k of three is
often cited as the minimum number of studies for
deriving population estimates (Fehr, Gelfand, &
Nag, 2010). Therefore, we only retained in our
meta-analysis those variables for which bivariate
effects with trust were reported in at least three
independent samples. We calculated the sample-
adjusted meta-analytic deviancy statistic to de-
tect outliers (Huffcutt & Arthur, 1995). We have
32 papers (38 independent samples) in our final
sample.
We coded each study for the critical contingen-
cies. To code integrative potential, the first author
and a research assistant who was blind to our hy-
potheses independently counted: (1) the total num-
ber of negotiation issues, (2) the number of logroll-
ing issues (issues that negotiators can trade off with
each other to increase the joint outcome; Thomp-
son, 1990b), (3) the number of distributive issues,
and (4) the number of contingency contracting is-
sues in each negotiation study. Any differences
between the coders were resolved by discussion.
Then, an index of integrative potential was calcu-
lated by dividing the sum of the number of logroll-
ing issues by the total number of negotiation is-
sues.3 The index therefore ranged from “0” to “1.”
This measure was appropriate for two reasons.
First, we defined integrative potential as the extent
to which negotiators are able to have a number of
possible agreements with different levels of joint
outcomes. Accordingly, it is the number of negoti-
ation issues that determines the possibility of ne-
gotiators constructing agreements with different
levels of joint outcomes. Second, given the limited
information about the negotiation reported in the
empirical studies, this coding method was feasible
3 We thank Judi McLean Parks for her suggestion re-
garding this index. We chose to (conservatively) exclude
the number of contingency contracting issues from the
numerator of the integrative potential index because con-
tingent agreements can be integrative or distributive in
nature. A contingent agreement, if ill constructed, can
destroy value rather than create it (Cassidy, 2009). We
re-performed moderator analysis with the number of con-
tingency contracting issues included in the measure of
integrative potential and found a similar result pattern.
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and constrained integrative potential within the
range between “0” and “1.”4
We identified five studies that examined dyadic
trust. All of them except for Morris, Nadler, Kurtz-
berg, and Thompson (2002) provided empirical jus-
tification for the dyad-level measure. Because our
theory involved congruence in the dyad, we ex-
cluded Morris et al. (2002) from our moderator
analysis of the level of trust; this did not change the
result pattern.
We defined perceived integrity as negotiators’
perceptions of their counterparts’ honesty, reliabil-
ity, dependability, and fairness (Kim, Ferrin, Coo-
per, & Dirks, 2004; Mayer et al., 1995), and a broad
measure of trust as negotiators’ intention to accept
vulnerability based on positive expectations of
their counterparts’ intentions or behaviors (Rous-
seau et al., 1998). Thus, if scales largely focused on
terms of honesty, reliability, dependability, fair-
ness, or related terms, they were coded as per-
ceived integrity. If scales captured global trust (e.g.,
“Howmuch did you trust the other party during the
negotiation?”; Maddux et al., 2008: 466), they were
coded as a broad measure of trust. The first and
second authors discussed the coding protocol and
reached a perfect agreement on the coding.
Analysis
We converted Pearson’s r, Cohen’s d, F statistics,
and t statistics to Fisher’s z scores (Lipsey & Wil-
son, 2001) for the calculation of relevant error sta-
tistics (Field, 2001). We reported the weighted
mean of correlation coefficients for each bivariate
relationship.
We analyzed the data using the software MIX Pro
2.0 (Bax, Yu, Ikeda, Tsuruta, & Moons, 2006). Con-
sistent with Erez, Bloom, andWells’s (1996) recom-
mendation and the majority of recent meta-analytic
studies, we adopted random-effects models to esti-
mate the bivariate relationships unless the Q and I2
statistics (Huedo-Medina, Sánchez-Meca,Marín-Mar-
tínez, & Botella, 2006) empirically confirmed the the-
oretical assumption of sample homogeneity, in
which case we adopted fixed-effects models
(Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). Fixed-effects models as-
sume that all the studies are drawn from the same
population and are functionally identical, whereas
random-effects models assume that studies are not
drawn from the same population and are not func-
tionally equivalent (Hedges & Vevea, 1998). Given
the influence of both sampling error and randomly
distributed sources of variance (Lipsey & Wilson,
2001), random-effects models allow us to make in-
ferences to studies with participants and measures
different from those included in our sample
(Hedges & Vevea, 1998).
We corrected all effect sizes for attenuation due to
unreliability in measurement (Hunter & Schmidt,
1990). For studies that did not provide these data,
we used the average coefficient for similar mea-
sures. We then weighted each effect size as a func-
tion of inverse variance (Cohn & Becker, 2003). We
calculated an optimally weighted corrected mean
effect size (Fisher’s z) and its corresponding 95%
confidence interval. We converted Fisher’s z back
to correlation coefficients to facilitate interpreta-
tion. For main effects, we further corrected for pub-
lication bias due to the “file drawer problem”
(Rosenthal, 1979). We adopted Duval and Tweed-
ie’s (2000) “trim and fill” method, which provided
the publication-bias-adjusted estimate of the true
mean effect size (Geyskens, Krishnan, Steenkamp,
& Cunha, 2009).
To be included in the moderation analysis, a
construct must have at least two effect sizes within
each subcategory to allow for stable estimation of
between-group homogeneity (Hedges & Olkin,
1985) using a fixed-effects model. A significant be-
tween-group homogeneity statistic (QB) indicated
that the moderator variable significantly explained
variability of effect sizes (i.e., a significant moder-
ating effect). For the continuous moderator vari-
able, integrative potential, we conducted weighted
least squares (WLS) regression analysis (Steel &
Kammeyer-Mueller, 2002) and calculated a cor-
rected z score (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).
RESULTS
We report our meta-analytic estimates for each
hypothesis in this section. Each main effect is
presented in Table 1. For weighted effect sizes
that needed further correction for publication
bias, we also reported the coefficients with cor-
rections for attenuation and publication bias in
the table note. Publication bias was detected in
4 One alternative we considered was to compare the
value of a pure even-split settlement relative to the value
of the optimal agreement. This was less consistent with
our definition and was also impractical to code. This
coding method set the minimum level of integrative poten-
tial to be “1” (i.e., the value ratio was constant regardless of
the agreements in distributive negotiations) but the maxi-
mum level of integrative potential was unknown.
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only one bivariate relationship, the trust–integra-
tive behaviors relationship.
Main Effects
The effects of trust on integrative behaviors, the
joint outcome, the trustor’s outcome, and outcome
satisfaction were all significantly positive, with
r  .32, .26, .10, and .48, respectively. The effect of
trust on distributive behaviors was negative and sig-
nificant, with r  .30. The effect of trust on the
trustor’s outcome was smaller than the effect of trust
on the joint outcome, z3.30 (p .001). Therefore,
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, 3a, 3c, and 4a were supported.
To further examine the relationships, we con-
ducted meta-analytic path analysis (Viswesvaran &
Ones, 1995). We hypothesized that the effects of
trust on the joint outcome (Hypothesis 2b) and the
trustor’s outcome (Hypothesis 3b) were fully medi-
ated by integrative behaviors and distributive be-
haviors, whereas the effects of trust on outcome
satisfaction (Hypothesis 4b) were partially medi-
ated by integrative behaviors and distributive be-
haviors. We first constructed the meta-analytic cor-
relation matrix (corrected for attenuation) based on
our sample (see Table 2). We then subjected the
meta-analytic correlation matrix to path analysis
using LISREL version 8.80 (Jöreskog & Sörbom,
1996). We followed Viswesvaran and Ones’ (1995)
recommendation and calculated the harmonic
mean sample size (n  376) for testing the signifi-
cance of the path coefficients. Integrative and dis-
tributive behaviors are considered alternate ap-
proaches that negotiators can pursue based on
various considerations (Savage, Blair, & Sorenson,
1989). They are not mutually exclusive, but more of
TABLE 1
Main Effects of Trust on Its Consequences in Interpersonal Negotiations
k N
r
(Uncorrected)
95% CI (r)
(Uncorrected)
rc
(Corrected)a
95% CI (rc)
(Corrected)a Q I2
Integrative behaviors 14 2,194 .26 [.15, .36] .32 [.19, .45] 99.99*** 87.00%
Distributive behaviors 14 1,984 .25 [.37, .13] .30 [.43, .16] 82.73*** 84.29%
Joint outcome 20 2,327 .22 [.11, .32] .26 [.12, .39] 135.91*** 86.02%
Trustor’s outcomeb 8 1,186 .09 [.01, .17] .10 [.02, .18] 10.55 33.62%
Outcome satisfaction 12 1,463 .38 [.30, .46] .48 [.37, .57] 41.93*** 73.77%
Note: k represents the number of independent samples. N represents the number of individuals. To prevent the error autocorrelation
problem within negotiation dyads that might decrease the significance of Fisher’s z, we used one negotiation party’s data, if provided, or
dyadic data for meta-analysis. Given that Q is statistically underpowered when the number of studies is low and when the sample size
within the studies is low, we also provided I2 [ 100%  (Q  df)/Q], with a larger value of I2 indicating more heterogeneity. Typically,
an I2 of 75% indicates large heterogeneity; 50%, moderate heterogeneity; and 25%, low heterogeneity.
a These estimates are weighted effect sizes corrected for attenuation only. There was publication bias in estimating integrative behaviors.
The mean correlation corrected for both attenuation and publication bias was .26 with 95% CI [.22, .31]. All the other coefficients were not
affected by publication bias.
b The coefficients for the trustor’s outcome were estimated using fixed-effects models rather than random-effects models because Q was
non-significant.
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
TABLE 2
Meta-Analytic Correlations
1 2 3 4 5
1. Trust
2. Integrative behaviors .32 (14, 1589)
3. Distributive behaviors .30 (14, 1240) .27 (7, 676)
4. Joint outcome .26 (20, 1215) .16 (7, 454) .23 (6, 318)
5. Trustor’s outcome .10 (8, 593) .18 (4, 297) .17 (2, 139) .45 (6, 412)
6. Outcome satisfaction .48 (12, 893) .32 (5, 431) .31 (3, 176) .06 (5, 321) .35 (4, 254)
Note: The correlations are all significant at the level of .05. The number of independent samples (k) and cumulative sample sizes (N),
respectively, are provided in parentheses.
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one implies less of the other and they may have
unmeasured common causes. There is some evi-
dence for the expected negative correlation (Gunia
et al., 2011). Thus, we allowed the residuals of
integrative and distributive behaviors to covary,
which significantly improved the model fit.
Our path model showed a good fit (see Figure 1):
2(2)  19.51, p  .001, SRMR  .06, CFI  .96,
IFI  .96, NFI  .96, and GFI  .98. All coefficients
below are significant at p  .05. Trust was signifi-
cantly related to both integrative behaviors ( 
.32) and distributive behaviors (  .30). Integra-
tive behaviors (  .11) and distributive behaviors
(  .20) were both significantly related to the
joint outcome. Integrative behaviors (.14) and
distributive behaviors (  .13) were both signifi-
cantly related to the trustor’s outcome. Trust ( 
.52), integrative behaviors (  .31), and distribu-
tive behaviors (  .56) were all positively related
to outcome satisfaction. In assessing the mediation
effects we hypothesized, we adopted the product-
of-coefficients approach popularized by Sobel
(1982), rather than the causal-steps approach pop-
ularized by Baron and Kenny (1986), because the
latter has low statistical power for detecting medi-
ation effects (see MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman,
West, & Sheets, 2002). With the product-of-coeffi-
cients approach (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2012; Rodell &
Colquitt, 2009), a statistically significant indirect
effect supports mediation when a direct effect is
also modeled.
First, we found significant indirect effects of trust
on the joint outcome via integrative behaviors (z’ 
1.47, p  .05; see MacKinnon et al., 2002: 90 for
details about z’) and via distributive behaviors (z’
3.01, p  .05). Second, we found significant indi-
rect effects of trust on the trustor’s outcome via
distributive behaviors (z’  2.71, p  .05) and via
integrative behaviors (z’  3.01, p  .05). Finally,
we found significant indirect effects of trust on
outcome satisfaction via integrative behaviors (z’ 
5.03, p  .05) and via distributive behaviors (z’ 
5.62, p  .05). Therefore, Hypotheses 2b, 3b, and
4b were supported.
Critical Contingencies
The average integrative potential of the sample
was .50, consistent with our starting assumption
that negotiations comprise both distributive and
integrative elements. Integrative potential moder-
ated the effect of trust on integrative behaviors (z 
FIGURE 1
Meta-Analytic Path Model of Trust in Interpersonal Negotiations
Note: * p  .05. Standardized regression coefficients are presented. 2(2, N  376)  19.51, p  .001, SRMR  .06, CFI . 96, IFI  .96,
NFI  .96, GFI  .98.
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2.44, p  .01) and the joint outcome (z  2.95, p 
.01). WLS regression analysis suggested that, as
integrative potential increased, the effect (Fisher’s
z) of trust on integrative behaviors (b  .31, cor-
rected SE  .13) and the joint outcome (b  .32,
corrected SE  .11) increased. After converting the
estimated Fisher’s z scores to correlations, we
found that the correlation between trust and inte-
grative behaviors was .51 when integrative poten-
tial was 1, .41 when integrative potential was mod-
erate (M  .58), and .25 when integrative potential
was 0. The correlation between trust and the joint
outcome was .39 when integrative potential was 1,
.26 when integrative potential was moderate (M 
.53), and .09 when integrative potential was 0.
Therefore, Hypotheses 5a and 5b were both
supported.
The level of trust moderated the relationship be-
tween trust and integrative behaviors (QB  7.01,
p .01), the joint outcome (QB 9.99, p .01), and
distributive behaviors (QB  16.82, p  .001) (see
Table 3). The positive effects of dyadic trust were
stronger than the effects of individual trust on inte-
grative behaviors (r  .42 vs. r  .30) and the joint
outcome (r  .37 vs. r  .20). Dyadic trust had a
stronger negative effect on distributive behaviors (r 
.49) than individual trust (r  .29). Accordingly,
Hypotheses 6a and 6b were supported.
For the meaning and measure of trust (see Table
4), we found that perceived integrity had a stronger
effect on distributive behaviors (r  .41) than a
broad measure of trust (r  .14) (QB  25.22, p 
.001). A broad measure of trust had a stronger effect
on integrative behaviors (r  .42) than perceived
integrity (r  .17) (QB  29.55, p  .001). However,
a broad measure and perceived integrity did not
have different effects on the joint outcome (r  .26
vs. r  .24) (QB .10, ns). Therefore, Hypothesis 7a
was supported whereas Hypothesis 7b was par-
tially supported.
DISCUSSION
The literatures on trust and negotiation have
separately been among the most vibrant areas of
research in recent decades. The present study
examines the effects of trust in the context of inter-
personal negotiations. In the subsequent para-
graphs, we will highlight several contributions that
are novel and important to these two literatures,
including: (a) the integration and cumulation of
existing empirical work, (b) insights into the com-
plex effects of trust on negotiation processes and
outcomes, (c) identification and quantification of
several critical contingencies of these effects, (d)
clarification of the implications of alternative defi-
nitions of trust, and (e) the articulation of how
social exchange may serve as a framework for
this area.
First, this study cumulates the empirical research
to resolve several fundamental questions about the
role of trust in negotiations. Specifically, trust is
often assumed to be integral to the negotiation ex-
perience, but scholars have advanced different per-
spectives on its implications. Similarly, empirical
studies designed to examine these issues have pro-
vided a range of findings for some outcomes while
overlooking others. By identifying and integrating
studies spread across several decades and litera-
tures in which trust was a variable (typically, not
the focal variable) and using meta-analytic proce-
dures, we were able to address fundamental ques-
TABLE 3
Moderator Analysis of the Level of Trust
Level of Trust k N rc 95% CI (rc) QB
Integrative behaviors Individual trust 12 2,012 .30 [.25, .35]
Dyadic trust 2 182 .42 [.23, .58]
7.01**
Distributive behaviors Individual trust 12 1,842 .29 [.34, .23]
Dyadic trust 2 142 .49 [.65, .28]
16.82***
Joint outcome Individual trust 15 1,859 .20 [.14, .26]
Dyadic trust 4 358 .37 [.24, .50]
9.99**
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
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tions about the role of trust. For example, we con-
firmed that trust did “pay” in terms of the joint
outcome and outcome satisfaction, and we identi-
fied situations under which trust was more impact-
ful. This should provide confidence and justifica-
tion for future research at the intersection of trust
and negotiations, as well as for claims about the
value of building trust for practice. At the same
time, the findings for trustors’ outcomes confirm
the skepticism regarding the implications of trust
and its potential risks. To address this skepticism,
research is needed to understand the conditions
under which trust yields higher versus lower or
negative trustors’ outcomes.
Second, we developed a path model that un-
packed the complex effects and processes by which
trust was related to key outcomes. This is important
for several reasons. One reason is that, while re-
search has examined a variety of outcomes, there
has been little attempt to connect them, which has
made it difficult to interpret current knowledge.
Our path model directly addressed this issue, re-
vealing that: (a) the effects of trust on these out-
comes were of different magnitudes, with one being
non-significant, and (b) the observed effects of trust
on these outcomes were, in part, due to the role of
other outcomes. A second benefit of the path model
was that it revealed the countervailing forces by
which trust operated on key outcomes. For exam-
ple, students and managers seek out negotiation
training with hopes of increasing their personal
outcomes. Our study identified the different paths
by which trust influenced the trustor’s outcome
and revealed the conflicting nature of their effects.
Specifically, trust had a positive relationship with
integrative behaviors, but integrative behaviors had
a negative relationship with the trustor’s outcome.
In contrast, trust had a negative relationship with
distributive behaviors, but distributive behaviors
had a positive relationship with the trustor’s out-
come. A final issue is that our path model demon-
strated that trust was more strongly related to the
joint outcome than the trustor’s outcome, and iden-
tified why that was the case. In contrast to the
countervailing effects for the individual outcome,
the effect of trust on the joint outcome was more
uniform. We found that trust inhibited distributive
behaviors which reduced the joint outcome, while
facilitating integrative behaviors which promoted
the joint outcome. In sum, the present model pro-
vides a fuller picture of processes by which trust
influences negotiation behaviors and outcomes, in-
cluding ways in which the impact is positive and
ways in which the impact is negative.
The latter issue may provide valuable insights
not only for negotiations but also for the trust liter-
ature more generally. Although the vast majority of
trust studies assume positive effects, trust scholars
have recognized a “dark side” of trust in which one
may be exploited by others (e.g., Langfred, 2004).
However, these options tend to be treated as a stark
dichotomy. Our analyses highlight that trust simul-
taneously sets in motion processes that can contrib-
ute to mutual and individual gains as well as mu-
tual and individual exploitation; the outcome is not
simply a gain or exploitation, but can be a complex
amalgamation of both. Thus, the results of trust in
even a single encounter may include positive and/or
negative effects. These insights may apply to a range
of situations in organizations and social dilemmas
that are structured with concurrent incentives to co-
TABLE 4
Moderator Analysis of the Measure and Meaning of Trust
Meaning of Trust k N rc 95% CI (rc) QB
Integrative behaviors Perceived integrity 6 956 .17 [.10, .24]
Broad measure of trust 8 1,238 .42 [.36, .47]
29.55***
Distributive behaviors Perceived integrity 8 894 .41 [.47, .34]
Broad measure of trust 6 1,090 .14 [.23, .06]
25.22***
Joint outcome Perceived integrity 12 1,555 .24 [.17, .30]
Broad measure of trust 7 734 .26 [.16, .35]
.10
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
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operate and compete. As an example, trust may in-
crease the extent to which an individual collaborates
with others tomaximize the group outcome in a team,
but it may simultaneously decrease one’s personal
outcome and related behaviors.
Third, the study offered insights into the condi-
tions under which the effects may be stronger or
weaker. One factor was the structure of the negoti-
ation, assessed as integrative potential. The con-
cept of integrative potential has been mentioned in
the literature, but, to date, there has been limited
empirical research on it. We found that, as the
integrative potential of a negotiation increases, the
relationship between trust and the joint outcome
increases in a linear fashion. This finding is impor-
tant because it can serve as a guideline for the types
of situations in which negotiators might increase
joint outcomes from building trust and those situ-
ations in which they should not expect an increase.
The concept of integrative potential may travel to
other contexts in which trust is studied. Previous
work has highlighted that the effects of trust vary
across situations (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001), but empirical
research has provided few insights into the condi-
tions. Our findings regarding integrative potential
suggest that trust will have greater effects in interper-
sonal situations where there are more, different pos-
sibilities for partners to reach their goals. The con-
cept may also be appropriate for work groups,
where members may be pursuing different, non-
exclusive goals.
Two other factors that determine the strengths of
the relationships between trust and its conse-
quences are the level and meaning of trust. Trust
studied as a dyadic concept, rather than an indi-
vidual-level concept, was more strongly related to
negotiation behaviors and the joint outcome. In
addition, trust conceptualized broadly was more
strongly associated with integrative behaviors, as
opposed to trust conceptualized more narrowly as
perceived integrity (a frequent approach in stud-
ies). These findings should be considered as core
research design issues in future research on trust in
negotiations. Our findings on the meaning of trust
highlight the importance of specifying the theoret-
ically appropriate conceptual definition and using
an established scale to measure trust as defined.
Furthermore, a logical extension of the work on
dyadic trust will be to consider the numerous pos-
sibilities for exploring asymmetries of trust (Tom-
linson et al., 2009). Our results suggest that practi-
tioners may want to shift their focus from training
negotiators how to earn the trust of the other party
(or trusting the other party) to training them how to
build dyadic trust, which is likely to yield more
significant benefits. Likewise, in advising negotia-
tors on the content of trust they need to establish,
our results suggest that demonstrating a broader
sense of trust—perhaps based on the array of integ-
rity, ability, and benevolence, as opposed to only
integrity—may yield stronger effects on integrative
behaviors.
Finally, the current study outlines how social
exchange theory can integrate existing work and
provide a platform for future research on trust and
negotiations. Social exchange theory complements
behavioral decision and social cognitive theories
that have served as key frameworks for negotiation
research to date. It has been recognized as a “frame-
work of reference within which many theories . . .
can speak to one another” (Emerson, 1976: 336) and
will allow findings to connect to and integrate with
the many other literatures in organizational behav-
ior that adopt social exchange theory (Cropanzano
& Mitchell, 2005).
Limitations and Future Research
The theoretical framework, our findings, and our
review of the literature provide the groundwork for
a research agenda on trust in the context of negoti-
ations. As a next step, given the evidence that
trust can be beneficial, it will be worthwhile to
understand how trust can be established in nego-
tiations. In the course of reviewing research for
this paper, we observed that there existed few
studies on this topic and they examined a limited
set of factors (e.g., small talk, trustors’ social mo-
tives, and prior experience). Thus, we recom-
mend that future studies examine the factors that
build trust, as well as the processes by which trust
changes and evolves.
A limitation of the existing research, which is
reflected in our findings, is that most of the studies
used samples from Western cultures. This raises
the question of whether the results would change
with samples from a different culture. In one of the
few studies that has examined the issue, Gunia et
al. (2011) modeled culture as directly influencing
trust and, in turn, influencing negotiation behav-
iors and outcomes. Trust is inherently related to the
cultural dimension of uncertainty avoidance or
tightness–looseness (see Gunia et al., 2011; Kong,
2013). Future research should further explore the
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cultural effects on trust and its relationships with
other variables in negotiations.
A second limitation relates to the timing of mea-
surement vis-à-vis the temporal nature of trust and
negotiation behaviors/outcomes. As noted earlier,
trust is a dynamic concept that unfolds and
changes over the period of the negotiation. In our
review of the studies included in our meta-analy-
sis, we found that trust was frequently measured
contemporaneously with negotiation behaviors or
outcomes, rather than being measured/manipu-
lated beforehand. A preliminary analysis of avail-
able lab study data indicated that trust measured
contemporaneously had stronger relationships
with integrative behaviors (r  .44 vs. r  .20, QB 
20.24, p  .001), distributive behaviors (r  .32
vs. r  .14, QB  7.53, p  .01), and the joint
outcome (r  .28 vs. r  .11, QB  9.30, p  .01)
than trust measured or manipulated beforehand.
Meta-analyses are not well suited to exploring tem-
poral dynamics or the possibility of relationships
being reciprocal. While we cannot establish the
dynamics of trust changes over time or the possi-
bility of reciprocal relationships between concepts,
our confidence in the causal order is increased by
two factors. First, we classified variables on the
basis of theory and how they tend to be positioned
in the existing literature. Second, laboratory stud-
ies that measured trust before its downstream vari-
ables provided a pattern of relationships with inte-
grative behaviors and the joint outcome that was
consistent with our predictions, despite their
smaller magnitudes relative to effects of trust mea-
sured contemporaneously. One obvious and impor-
tant direction for future research is for scholars to
better align the timing of measurement with the
temporal nature of predictions.
Third, we observed that studies of trust in inter-
personal negotiations used a wide range definitions
and measures of trust. Thus, the question raised by
Ross and LaCroix (1996: 315)—“what exactly is
meant by ‘trust?’”—appears to be as appropriate
today as it was more than 15 years ago. As noted
above, although the trust literature has seen a vari-
ety of definitions—including trust as a belief, an
expectation, a disposition, an intention, and even a
behavior—researchers have recently made progress
toward developing consensus on what trust is and
how it should be operationalized (Dirks & Ferrin,
2002; Ferrin et al., 2008; McEvily & Tortoriello,
2011). However, our review of the studies informs
us that these advances have made little headway
into the negotiation literature, and yet these issues
have an impact on results. Given the limitations of
existing data, however, our findings should be in-
terpreted with caution. We proffer two recommen-
dations for future research. First, in designing studies,
we suggest that researchers consider which form of
trust is theoretically the most appropriate for the
given research question. For example, should a study
treat trust as a broader construct, or should it focus on
a specific factor such as integrity? Second, once that
decision is made, researchers should select a vali-
dated measure of trust instead of creating their own
(see McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011).
CONCLUSION
Whether one is a researcher or a practitioner, one
can hardly discuss negotiation without mentioning
trust. However, until now, that discussion has not
been informed by a systematic cumulation and
analysis of the empirical literature. Our meta-anal-
ysis has provided strong evidence that the per-
ceived relevance of trust in negotiations is indeed
warranted and that the concern about trust being a
liability for personal outcomes also has merit. In
addition, our meta-analysis has identified and val-
idated several critical contingencies that influence
the effects of trust on negotiation behaviors and
outcomes. Finally, our study has highlighted sev-
eral opportunities for future research and, we hope,
has also provided a strong platform for advancing
such research on this important topic.
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